machine. Reducing everything to atomistic mechanics leaves the question open to its presence, its origin, form and structure, its laws, its controlling system and the instigating power, the motor of its mechanical functioning.
This idea can be valid in explaining the mechanism of phenomena, already in existence, but does not explain its very existence and why such mechanism should function.
Scientific verificationalism rejects metaphysical speculations as non subject to empiricism. But, facing a phenomenon, the scientist is forced to take a stand towards these questions. He can either believe in a causal finality or reject it. The fact remains valid that lacking the establishment of any links between the universe and a presumed finality leaves the question open to individual convictions, and the scientist is no exception. Any individual, whether a scientist or not, may oscillate between causal finalities and scientific mechanicism, but has to make his decision either way. He cannot believe in causality and reject it at one and the same time.
If finality, internal or external, can be identified and indicates that ‘intentional action leads to a purpose’, and that finality is ‘the final cause determining the presence and maturity of an object, we can demand why is it the case?
If we accept the argument of a believer in external finality and things are made for an external purpose, then man ought to serve a cause other than himself; an inadmitted cause by science and a metaphysical presumption.
The encounter between man and phenomenon sets off the process of thinking leading to an inevitable end: a choice.’ It is to this end we attributesense. The end of a human being is to procreate or to die, forexample,
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