Dave uses a folding mirror to illustrate this Pleiadian model for reality known as Time Theory. This is part 3 of 3.
Video Rating: 5 / 5
“If we admit what Hume calls the mind’s ‘propensity to spread itself on external objects’, we can understand the supposed objectivity of moral qualities as arising from what we can call the projection or objectification of moral attitudes. This would be analogous to what is called the ‘pathetic fallacy’, the tendency to read our feelings into their objects. If a fungus, say, fills us with disgust, we may be inclined to ascribe to the fungus itself a non-natural quality of foulness… Aesthetic values are logically in the same position as moral ones; much the same metaphysical and epistemological considerations apply to them, but aesthetic values are less strongly objectified than moral ones.” – JL Mackie There are no such things as objective values, and even if there were we would have no way to know anything about them. Values are aspects OF OUR PERCEPTIONS of the world, not aspects INHERENT TO the world. For more information on these issues feel free to read my paper at the following link. It’s the first essay: www.towson.edu
Well, yes, but you’re saying that nobody wants to be slaughtered, or wants their friends or family slaughtered, and nobody wants to live in a society where senseless killing is ok…
This is why I think rights are useful. Rather than trading explicit actions, they trade principles. If someone gets a thrill out of killing people, then it’s still wrong for them to do so, because it’s a guarantee that that pleasure is outweighed by suffering on the other end.
My video “Introduction to Meta-Ethics” explains this in more detail. It all has to do with how we should interpret our moral language; what is it that our moral language is trying to refer to? I’m of the opinion that the moral discourse requires objectivism, and since that can’t be met I fall into Error Theory.
This is a good point, however it seems that the way we use our moral language demands something more than subjectivism.
When I say senseless killing is wrong, what am I really saying? Am I merely expressing my own personal disapproval of slaughtering humans? Heck no! I’m saying that senseless killing is wrong for everyone, even if they enjoy it!
I guess you could say I have a sort of “emergent” or “bottom up” view.
“Most people accept… …of moral values.”
This is a good point. What if they are the same, except that aesthetic values vary wildly between individuals, while moral values are much more likely to be common because of their aid in natural selection and their more extreme consequences? Makes sense to me.
Well, I would say “wrongness” and “rightness” exist, but they exist on a personal level. I know what causes me to suffer, and other people know what causes them to suffer, and we can communicate those conditions. “Wrongness” then is whatever I don’t want to happen to me, as determined by my neural hardwiring and evolution. Certain things can then be expected to be “wrong” to (pretty much) everyone else, for the same reasons.