Dave uses a folding mirror to illustrate this Pleiadian model for reality known as Time Theory. This is part 3 of 3.
Video Rating: 5 / 5
“If we admit what Hume calls the mind’s ‘propensity to spread itself on external objects’, we can understand the supposed objectivity of moral qualities as arising from what we can call the projection or objectification of moral attitudes. This would be analogous to what is called the ‘pathetic fallacy’, the tendency to read our feelings into their objects. If a fungus, say, fills us with disgust, we may be inclined to ascribe to the fungus itself a non-natural quality of foulness… Aesthetic values are logically in the same position as moral ones; much the same metaphysical and epistemological considerations apply to them, but aesthetic values are less strongly objectified than moral ones.” – JL Mackie There are no such things as objective values, and even if there were we would have no way to know anything about them. Values are aspects OF OUR PERCEPTIONS of the world, not aspects INHERENT TO the world. For more information on these issues feel free to read my paper at the following link. It’s the first essay: www.towson.edu
most comments are 6months ago its 2010 and i find this info current and very usefull .Thank you for the clarity and the infinite work..
My answer is yes. We can stop misinterpreting reality and begin to choose differently if we want. When we learn new understandings of who, what and where we are, we evolve as consciousness to new dimensions of thought and being. You might find my other video of interest. It is called “12 Dimensions of Consciousness”. It talks about manifesting reality from this school of thought.
so if we all in TIME then what? whats this mean, does it mean we can do something with it if, if that makes sence
only you can teach yourself that is one thing i know is true in this whole video.
Yea thanks alot! still trying to comprehend.Guess Im still perceiving threw a paralyzed mindset!
Still digesting this, Thanks for sharing.
dagnabbit way to blast my worldview. Now I’m going to have reconsider all sorts of things.
You present your argument as:
P1) If x has a categorical reason for ?ing, then x is
morally obligated to ?.
P2) No such categorical reasons exist.
C) Therefore, x is never morally obligated to ?
One problem is that the conclusion doesn’t follow. Unless you revise the first premise to be biconditional or reverse the antecedent and consequent, the argument is fallacious (this argument follows the pattern A->B; not A; therefore not B). I do find your arguments for P2 compelling, though.
This might imply that the distinction between subjective and objective is being stretched to inappropriate contexts, or that the distinction is a faulty one entirely. Clearly if one accepts that “the good” is just like pain, then the position one is forced to take is more like subjectivism/intersubjectivism than objectivism.
Actually, he listed reasons for why objectivism is correct rather than subjectivism: look at statement #5 – “Moral utterances evoke abstract singular terms (e.g. “good”), suggesting they are intended to pick out objective properties.
I don’t think this is sufficient for rejecting subjectivism, though. What about pain? According to your premise, it would seem reasonable to also think pain is referring to an objective feature. Continued…
1.) You skipped straight from non-cog. is false to arguments for cog.-objectivism. What happened to subjectivism and intersubjectivism?
2.) Error theory and success theory are not sub-categories of objectivism. Success theory does imply the existence of moral facts, but an error theorist can think that, while moral statements have truth value, they cannot correspond or we can’t know whether they correspond to any moral facts. That’s why they can never be true.
Your presentation of the argument from relativity involves a false dichotomy.
That was very good video, very well laid out and reasoned.
Further, I additionally put forth that differing perceptions or no, moral laws can only exist IF and ONLY IF there is an objective reality to them- that is, if they are put forth from and as laws set down by an objective power or being, either in the cognitive mind (which, again, I hold that all such minds differ and thus there is no universal law to stand) or by an outside authority (ex. God, and as God cannot be proven or disproven, laws based on faith are subjective.)
I’m new to this… 🙂
I cannot see moral inclinations and statements as true or false- if everyone, as Kierkegaard and later Nietzsche stated, have different perceptions and thus different personal synthetic realites under conditions of organized society, and if as Hobbes claimed we there is no law in that outside organizd society (the state of nature) then I put forth that since no perceptions and thus impressions of moral laws can be wholy true for everyone and thus a universal law, there are no moral laws.
Hume obviously had a very nominal understanding of the scope science is capable of achieving. I fail to see how understanding love as a complete neurological phenomena necessarily devalues the concept of love. In fact I find it a much more fascinating explanation than any philosopher could pull out of his ass.
Hume’s Is/Ought distinction is purposely non-scientific. Hume was adamant that his philosophical inquiries were NOT scientific; there are some things in the realm of natural science (physics, etc) that phil. shouldn’t pursue. This also means that scientific accounts of how the MIND works (the only thing Hume was ultimately interested in) will never be satisfying, or in many cases even possible. i.e. describing “love” as a series of neurological processes etc. would be rather…empty, for Hume.
Thanks for sharing this valuable information.
Hear hear!
Hmm I think Nietzsche does a fairly good job of laying out where moral language comes from. I don’t believe in objective moral standards, so i’d fall into line with noncognitivism, and I think Nietzsche explains well where out preconceptions about morality come from. He more or less shows that our conceptions are learned. I believe more useful than talking about what morality objectively is would be a discussion on what moral principles we should agree upon to benefit society.
Can you tell me how one would derive this conclusion from science? I see this “ought from an is” argument as a strawman stemming from a misunderstanding of how scientific knowledge is applied.
“It seems that you are redefining the term “right””
Yeah, basically, but it still works in most (if not all) of the same contexts (obviously excluding statements about their origin).
It seems that you are redefining the term “right” away from the absolutism that is normally associated with it. However, as long as you make that perfectly clear from the get-go I guess there’s nothing wrong with defining your own terms.
Also, one should note that what Moral Error Theory is arguing against is something analogous to Plato’s “Form of the Good.” The Error Theorist thinkssuch beliefs are ontologically queer, can have no place in a naturalistic worldview, and should be rejected.
I don’t know if I’m getting the idea across well, but it seems pretty powerful to me as a model.
Here’s another example I use:
Since the right to life is sort of a trade of principles, then if you attempt to take my life, you have in that action forfeited your right to your own, which explains killing in self-defense and capital punishment, although it’s still “better” to find anothey way, so you and everyone else can still benefit from your life. Killing you takes away that potential.
If it’s OK for a serial killer to murder people, then it would be OK for anyone else to do to him whatever would make him suffer a lot, even if he’s also a masochist.
I don’t think it actually is subjective.